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Abstract—Building shared understanding of requirements is
key to ensuring downstream software activities are efficient and
effective. However, in continuous software engineering (CSE)
some lack of shared understanding is an expected, and essential,
part of a rapid feedback learning cycle. At the same time, there
is a key trade-off with avoidable costs, such as rework, that
come from accidental gaps in shared understanding. This trade-
off is even more challenging for non-functional requirements
(NFRs), which have significant implications for product suc-
cess. Comprehending and managing NFRs is especially difficult
in small, agile organizations. How such organizations manage
shared understanding of NFRs in CSE is understudied. We
conducted a case study of three small organizations scaling up
CSE to further understand and identify factors that contribute
to lack of shared understanding of NFRs, and its relationship to
rework. Our in-depth analysis identified 41 NFR-related software
tasks as rework due to a lack of shared understanding of
NFRs. Of these 41 tasks 78% were due to avoidable (accidental)
lack of shared understanding of NFRs. Using a mixed-methods
approach we identify factors that contribute to lack of shared
understanding of NFRs, such as the lack of domain knowledge,
rapid pace of change, and cross-organizational communication
problems. We also identify recommended strategies to mitigate
lack of shared understanding through more effective management
of requirements knowledge in such organizations. We conclude
by discussing the complex relationship between shared under-
standing of requirements, rework and, CSE.
Index Terms—shared understanding, non-functional require-
ments, continuous software engineering, rework
I. INTRODUCTION
Shared understanding is a critical success factor in achieving
high quality software that meets stakeholders’ needs [1]. It also
fosters a more effective, motivated, and collaborative team,
more efficient use of resources, and less conflict [2]. How-
ever, empirical research on shared understanding in software
engineering projects is scarce [3].
Another critical success factor in software is non-functional
requirements (NFR) [4], [5], also known as architecturally
significant requirements [6]. NFRs, such as PRIVACY, have
the potential to derail a software product, for example, if the
system violates elements of Europe’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). However, in continuous software engi-
neering (CSE), similar to agile software development, func-
tional requirements (FR) are the primary focus, while NFRs
are neglected [7]. CSE, especially in small, agile organizations,
focuses on automated, rapid release of working software, and
often leads to short-term FR prioritization [8].
One problem with neglecting requirements is requirements-
related rework: the extra work needed to fix problems in
software due to poorly understood requirements. Rework is
extremely costly [9] and accounts for 40-50% of the effort
on software projects [10]. Some rework may be due to an
avoidable lack of shared understanding, which we define as
accidental lack of shared understanding. In CSE, however,
some amount of a lack of shared understanding is essential:
inherent in dealing with the essential complexity of software
[11], it captures the unknown unknowns [12] and represents
desirable learning and feedback [13].
In this paper we describe empirical evidence from a multi-
case, mixed-method study of shared understanding of NFRs in
three small, agile organizations employing CSE. To concep-
tualize lack of shared understanding of NFRs we traced it to
rework development tasks. Seeking to shed light on the com-
plex relationship between shared understanding, rework, and
CSE, our study examined forty-one NFR-related development
tasks identified as rework and was driven by the following
research questions:
RQ1: What contributes to lack of shared understanding
of NFRs?
RQ2: Which NFRs are most associated with a lack of
shared understanding?
RQ3: What amount of a lack of shared understanding of
NFRs is accidental versus essential?
In our close, iterative interactions with our industrial part-
ners, we learned what factors contribute to a lack of shared
understanding of NFRs, a large proportion of rework was due
to an accidental lack of shared understanding, and strategies
our collaborators recommended to avoid it. Our work brings
two significant contributions:
1) We add to the scarce, yet much needed, empirical ev-
idence on shared understanding of NFRs in software
engineering, including contributing factors and practices
towards avoiding it.
2) We bring awareness, based on empirical findings, to
challenges that CSE brings to shared understanding of
NFRs.
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Finally, our study provides important implications for both
research and practice. For research, there is a need to address
new challenges brought forth by CSE in RE by revisiting
supporting roles, methods, and tools for the identification,
documentation, and communication of requirements. For prac-
titioners, we outline how to document and communicate NFRs
to avoid a lack of understanding in CSE.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Shared Understanding
Creating a shared understanding is an important aspect and
challenge to consider when attempting to develop high-quality
software [14], especially in RE [15]. Yet there has been a lack
of “systematic treatment or classification of the different forms
of shared understanding, neither in general nor in a software
engineering context” [3]. Glinz and Fricker [3] developed
a model describing four quadrants of shared understanding
consisting of two forms, explicit and implicit shared under-
standing, and two categories, true and false understanding.
The most important goal of RE is to create a shared
understanding between the development team and stakeholders
[16]; moreover, the practice of creating and maintaining a
shared understanding is not well established [17]. Previous
work has shown that a misunderstanding of requirements at
the beginning of development resulted in substantial rework
[18]. Unfortunately, shared understanding is often passive,
informal, and unstructured [3]; the result of which negatively
affects software quality and necessitates rework [19], which is
further compounded with the cross-cutting nature of NFRs. A
recent survey [20] stipulates creating a shared understanding
of customer expectations is the top challenge in agile adoption,
yet understudied [3]. However, shared understanding of NFRs
is even harder to study, due to the cross-cutting nature of
NFRs, and has not been studied in the rapidly changing
environments of agile or CSE, yet remains a critical success
factor to software and merits further attention.
B. Non-Functional Requirements
Despite their importance to success [3], NFRs are ambigu-
ous, not well documented, shared in an informal matter, and
not well understood [21], [22]. The wide-ranging and extensive
NaPiRE study [23] found that “unclear / unmeasurable” NFRs
were one of the top problems respondents had in their small
organizations [24]. What some organizations think are NFRs
are actually FRs [25]. NFRs are also inherently difficult to
verify or validate [26], [27]. NFRs are cross-cutting across
multiple disciplines, especially in a short, fast paced software
development iterations [28]. Finally, the inability to decom-
pose an NFR into measureable and valuable artifacts that can
be completed within a release cadence [28] further increases
the difficulty in managing an NFR in CSE. This difficulty
impedes the forming of a shared understanding of that NFR
and can result in costly rework. A number of empirical studies
have been performed on the challenges of NFRs in practice
[29]–[31]; however, these studies do not focus on identifying
lack of shared understanding of NFRs in CSE.
C. Rework
Various definitions and classifications of rework have been
proposed, such as Swanson’s three classification types (cor-
rective, adaptive, and perfective) [32] or Basili’s classification
based on the source of rework [33]. Regardless of the classi-
fication and the large costs associated with rework [33], there
is consensus that some rework could not have been prevented
[10] and is acceptable. In fact, a certain amount of rework
is desirable [34], as no rework could indicate developers are
not performing their jobs with due diligence, popularized in
the ideas captured by Ries [35]. Technical debt due to NFRs
increases the number of quality issues, which can worsen and
compound rework upon rework in later development phases
[36]. False implicit shared understanding [3] of NFRs can
lead to substantial technical debt and ultimately force an
organization to perform major rework [37].
D. Continuous Software Engineering
CSE is a paradigm that emphasizes rapid and automated
releases of working software [38]. This suggests that RE,
including the treatment of NFRs, are more challenging in CSE,
whereby many common best practices may not be followed
and requirements may be informally captured “just-in-time”
[39].
A number of studies [40]–[45] have explicitly studied the
management of NFRs in a CSE context; however, none of
them focus on the associated lack of shared understand-
ing. Feitelson describes how Facebook uses an open source
tool, Perflab, to provide metrics which Facebook monitors
to evaluate the PERFORMANCE of their system [43]. While
metrics are a key strategy to operationalize and create a shared
understanding of an NFR in CSE, Perflab is self-proclaimed
as “not supported” and “not turn-key”.
For software SECURITY, Jaatun argues that proper attention
to incident management, including involding and educating
developers, can help alleviate SECURITY issues in CSE [40];
although this is strictly for SECURITY and is primarily focused
on the Building Security In Maturity Model [46].
Other studies [41], [42], [45] examine how to architect a
system to be used in CSE, primarily focusing on deploying
as a serverless cloud-based platform. These studies focus
on NFRs, such as SCALABILITY and DEPLOYABILITY, that
have significant influence on a system’s architecture, including
positives, negatives, and trade-offs. While these studies show
how to architect a system in CSE, they do not look at how to
create a true shared understanding of explicit NFRs in CSE.
Furthermore, no empirical evidence exists that measures the
effect of shared understanding of NFRs [3], let alone in CSE.
Thus, our goal is to fill this gap in research by explicitly
focusing on the state of the practice of shared understanding
of NFRs in CSE.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We conducted a multi-case study [47] using a mixed-
methods approach [48] in collaboration with three independent
organizations using qualitative and immersive techniques [49].
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To study lack of shared understanding of NFRs in relation to
rework, we investigated how the organizations handled NFRs
and specifically traced lack of shared understanding on NFRs
to rework tasks. In an iterative, collaborative process with our
partner organizations, we performed an in-depth analysis of
such tasks to identify reasons for lack of shared understanding,
including whether it was accidental or essential, and which
practices to employ to avoid lack of shared understanding.
A. Collaborating Organizations
We identified three small, agile organizations using CSE and
cloud-based platforms through local contacts and trade shows.
Our organizations shared development artifacts, granted access
to employees, and participated in focus groups. For this paper
our organizations are referred to as Alpha, Beta, and Gamma.
Each organization develops in-house software utilizing cloud-
based platforms, which contributes to their primary source of
revenue. Each organization has been in business for 8-10 years
and has 40-100 employees. Each organization implements
CSE, including automated builds and testing and varying levels
of automated deployment. One important trait is that the bulk
of their respective development teams are co-located, with
few exceptions. This distinction is important, as it eliminates
the plethora of problems associated with globally distributed
software development, in particular RE [50]–[52].
Alpha works in the crowdsourcing industry collecting large
amounts of data on a daily basis. Beta provides an e-commerce
platform for customers distributed worldwide. Gamma is an
online content provider, including advertisements.
B. Preliminary Study
We first sought to understand which NFRs were relevant to
our organizations and what processes and tools they employ
to handle NFRs. One author spent multiple days over a few
months embedded at each organization, learning about their
products, processes, and business [49]. Through our immersive
visits we spoke with 37 different team members from various
departments. Across our organizations, we spoke with 17
developers, 8 development managers, 5 product managers, 4
executives, 2 customer success specialists, 1 quality assurance
member, and 1 director of sales. As part of these informal
conversations, we discussed shared understanding, NFRs, and
rework, including how much each organization estimates they
spend on rework, how they manage tacit knowledge, and
NFRs that cause rework. Our early immersive meetings and
observations at our organizations informed our focused inves-
tigation into the lack of shared understanding of NFRs and its
relationship to rework.
C. Data Collection
To analyze lack of shared understanding of NFRs as it
materialized in rework, we performed an in-depth analysis
of development tasks at each organization, where each task
represented either a bug, feature, a story, or an epic, depending
on the context at each organization. We analyzed and system-
atically coded these development tasks from task-management
A. Total Number of Tasks (30,503 - A: 18,890; B: 4475; G: 7138)
B. Tasks Available to Us (19,060 - A: 9859; B: 2629; G: 6572)
C. Tasks We Analyzed (2522 - A: 445; B: 357; G: 1720)
D. Tasks We Identified as Rework (348 - A: 85; B: 143; G: 120)
E. Tasks We Presented to Orgs for Validation 
(174 - A: 49; B: 36; G: 89)
F. Tasks Confirmed as Rework due to LSU of NFRs 
(41 - A: 15; B: 15; G: 11)
Fig. 1. Sampling of rework tasks due to lack of shared understanding of
NFRs (Total # of tasks - # of tasks at Alpha (A); Beta (B); and Gamma (G))
tools in relation to three elements: 1) NFRs, 2) lack of shared
understanding, and 3) rework. This coding was developed and
validated in an iterative and collaborative process with our
organizations over two full months. We indicate below the
full time taken for specific analysis activities.
1) Identification of NFR-related Development Tasks that
Represented Rework: Each organization granted us access to
their respective task management tool (Jira) under a non-
disclosure agreement. We exported all available tasks, and
associated attributes through a script over one week and
spent another week understanding the data. The resulting data
contained 30,503 tasks across our organizations (Figure 1
Box A). Due to the large number of tasks and limited time
with each organization, we performed task sampling over four
weeks to achieve a more practical and manageable number of
tasks for our analysis, as summarized in Figure 1.
With the help of each organization, we removed tasks of
projects with employees unavailable for our focus groups,
reducing the number of tasks to 19,060 (Figure 1 Box B).
We then narrowed the analysis to the most recently closed
tasks in the last 12 months, totalling 2522 tasks (Figure 1
Box C), to ensure that our validation of NFRs and rework with
employees was possible. The vast majority of the four weeks
was spent on identifying which of these 2522 tasks represented
rework, we 1) analyzed each attribute of a task (title, summary,
description, comments, assignee, date, estimated time) and
identified keywords such as ’refactor’, ’rework’, ’improve’
and 2) examined references to previous tasks. This analysis
resulted in 348 tasks that we believed represented rework
(Figure 1 Box D).
2) 1st Member Checking and Validation of Rework Tasks:
We then confirmed if each task actually represented rework
and, more importantly, if that rework was due to lack of
shared understanding of NFRs. We held a number of meetings
at each organization to discuss our selection of tasks; these
meetings were always attended by 1) two researchers, 2)
one developer, and 3) one manager, where each employee
had a considerable amount of breadth and depth of technical
knowledge. We started off by clarifying the definition of NFRs,
shared understanding, rework, and the relationship between the
three to ensure consistency. Due to partner time constraints, we
discussed only 174 of the 348 tasks we identified as rework
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TABLE I
BASE FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS
Q# Question
Q1 Do you know when/why/how the rework in this task was done?
Q2 Do you know when/why/how the original work leading up to this
task was done?
Q3 Which NFR or NFRs do you associate with the lack of shared
understanding of this task?
Q4 Do you know why there was a lack of shared understanding of
the NFR for this task?
Q5 What could the organization have done to prevent the lack of
shared understanding for this task?
Q6 Do you know why this action was not taken for this task?
Q7 Do you believe this lack of shared understanding was avoidable
for this task?
Q8 How complex do you believe this task was? (Small, Medium, or
Large)
Q9 How important was this task to the organization? (High, Medium,
or Low)
Q10 Do you have anything else to add?
(Figure 1 Box E). Overall, our organizations confirmed 41
tasks as rework due to lack of shared understanding of NFRs
(Figure 1 Box F). These 41 tasks were used as the basis for
our in-depth analysis through further focus group sessions at
each organization.
3) Focus Group Sessions on Rework Associated with Lack
of Shared Understanding of NFRs: We scheduled focus group
sessions at each organization to discuss each organization’s
share of the 41 rework tasks. We examined the factors con-
tributing to lack of shared understanding (RQ1), which NFRs
were more prone to lack of shared understanding (RQ2), and
what amount of lack of shared understanding could be avoided
(accidental) versus essential in the complex relationship with
rework (RQ3). Each focus group lasted three hours and, similar
to the validation of rework tasks, involved 1) two researchers,
2) one developer, and 3) one manager. We performed 2 focus
group sessions at each organization. The base set of questions
for each of the 41 tasks is in Table I. We clarified the definition
of NFRs, shared understanding, rework, avoidability, and the
relationship between the four in a similar fashion to our
1st member checking phase. For example, we ensured that
each participant equally understood avoidable in the sense
that the organization could have prevented the lack of shared
understanding by taking action prior to the rework task arising.
These sessions were, with permission, audio-recorded.
D. Data Analysis
To answer our research questions, our data analysis triangu-
lated contextual data from our preliminary study, quantitative
data collected from each organization’s task management tool,
and qualitative data from the in-depth, focus-group sessions
on the 41 rework tasks due to lack of shared understanding of
NFRs. The key to our analysis of the rich, rework task data was
the contextual, organizational knowledge we acquired during
the preliminary study at each organization.
To analyze the qualitative data, we transcribed the record-
ings of the focus-group sessions to obtain 41 transcripts, taking
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LSU OF AN NFR (RQ1)
Theme Associated Codes
Fast Pace of Change
EducationalRework
JustGetItToWork
LackOfResources
LackOfTests
ThirdPartyIntegration
TradeOff
Lack of Domain Knowledge
BusinessContext
DifferentPriorityScale
ChangeHereBreaksThere
ChangingRequirements
LackOfKnowledge
Inadequate Communication
Ambiguous
Communication
InformationOverload
one week. We performed thematic analysis [53] spanning 4
weeks on these transcripts. We used an open coding [54]
approach to develop a purely inductive codebook [53], which
minimizes a coder’s ability to force a bias of any particular
hypothesis. In the initial coding phase, a transcript was inde-
pendently coded by two coders, after which an agreement ses-
sion was held to discuss the codes, consolidate the codebook,
and to calculate Cohen’s kappa coefficient. We continued
until the kappa value stabilized above 0.6 (substantial inter-
rater reliability agreement [55]), which occurred at the 20th
transcript. Each of the remaining 21 transcripts was coded by a
single coder and reviewed by a different coder. Throughout all
coding we used the constant comparison method; codes were
added, removed, and merged based on the discussions between
the coders. Our final codebook took two weeks to compile
and had 48 codes (85% of the codes were used in the first
10 transcripts). The complete codebook is in our replication
package. To answer RQ1 and RQ3, we employed thematic syn-
thesis [53] over a two week period to abstract themes from our
derived codes. We constructed themes by contemplating how
different codes may be combined to form overarching themes.
Three themes emerged as factors contributing to the lack of
shared understanding of NFRs (RQ1). Similarly, a number
of themes emerged related to the accidental versus essential
nature of shared understanding (RQ3), including practices to
avoid a lack of shared understanding. We performed a 2nd
round of member checking with our organizations to validate
these themes. For RQ2, we counted the number of references
to particular NFRs for each task.
IV. FINDINGS
RQ1: What Contributes to Lack of Shared Understanding of
NFRs? We asked participants if they knew why there was lack
of shared understanding of NFRs for each of the 41 tasks (Q4).
In our data analysis three themes emerged: fast pace of change,
lack of domain knowledge, and inadequate communication.
The themes and associated codes are in Table II.
1) Fast Pace of Change (33 of 41 tasks): When an organi-
zation is moving rapidly there is little emphasis on NFRs due
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to the immense pressure to release a product, e.g. a manager
at Beta discussing why USABILITY is not on the forefront
“time constraints, had to be out. When it was originally
written we just needed it to work.” Similarly, when considering
DEPLOYABILITY, a manager at Alpha said “when you’re
first starting out it’s move fast and break things; get things
out the door. There’s fallout, could be minimal fallout, but
something you take a chance on.” Both Beta and Gamma
suffered from EXTENSIBILITY issues, recently performed a
rewrite, and optimism surrounds the ability to increase shared
understanding of the new system, e.g. “our new [redacted]
so a lot of our debugging like live to on the server is going
to go away so that will change if you’d come and interview
me in two weeks and see a completely different conversation”
(Developer at Beta).
Lack of testing was also a result of moving too fast, as
our organizations admitted to not performing adequate testing,
of either FRs or NFRs due to insufficient resources (time or
people), e.g. “we weren’t doing any kind of testing, a/b testing
or anything like that to assess PERFORMANCE or whether
these changes were having a positive or negative impact”
(Developer at Gamma).
2) Lack of Domain Knowledge (29 of 41 tasks): Domain
knowledge is the business-specific context required to compete
in a particular domain. Glinz and Fricker’s paper on shared
understanding [3] mentions domain knowledge as a problem
to building shared understanding. Our participants were clear
that understanding the market you are developing for is key
to continued success for the entire organization, e.g., “it’s
important to have that business context of how people are
going to use it and that’s probably the biggest stride being
made, is just trying to expand internally what we know about
business context so that new people coming in [are aware]”
(Developer at Alpha). Lack of domain knowledge can cause
lack of shared understanding of NFRs if an organization
is entering a new, unfamiliar market where even a basic
understanding would be beneficial, e.g. “if we had known more
about the industry, which I mean again even just a user of
the industry” (Developer at Beta) with respect to having a
narrow view and not consider EXTENSIBILITY. Alternatively,
lack of shared understanding could occur due to the unknown
unknowns [12], e.g. “lack of scope, we never considered that
this would be a thing” (Manager at Beta) concerning the
SCALABILITY of how one of their customer’s would utilize
a particular feature.
We also observed an organization’s difficulty in adapting to
new horizontal markets with respect to localization techniques
that created MAINTAINABILITY issues, e.g. “start an app early
on for North American companies requiring one [format]. As
your app becomes more popular you start getting requests
for new countries that use [other] formats” (Manager at
Beta). Even if domain knowledge is well known, the level
of comprehension or understanding may change, which may
bring new knowledge about a particular NFR, e.g. “they
changed because of increased comprehension of the problem
space we were trying to solve” (Developer at Gamma) in
regards to acknowledging they did not grasp a EXTENSIBILITY
requirement.
We also found the priority of an NFR is a result of the level
of shared understanding of that NFR. Reaching consensus on
the priority of an NFR may be difficult due to a discrepancy
in perceived importance between different units within an
organization, as a developer at Gamma stated “definitely NFRs
tend to be lower priority, or at least perceived as by the
business as low priority”. Additionally, we observed assessing
an NFR as low importance until the NFR becomes such a
problem that the system no longer functions, e.g. “I would
say PERFORMANCE is never a high priority until somebody
says it doesn’t work for me in which case you’ve graduated
from an NFR to it is not functioning for me” (Developer at
Beta).
Finally, organizations also face difficulty when dealing with
complicated NFRs, such as PRIVACY [56]. Our organizations
are particularly concerned about PRIVACY as they are col-
lecting and managing a lot of customer data. PRIVACY can
be challenging as a developer may not have legal expertise
to determine the correct course of action to comply with
privacy law. Hence, legal consultants are frequently relied
upon to provide guidance. However, despite legal consultation,
Gamma’s compliance with GDPR was hindered due to the
inexperience of the developers. Even if a developer acquired
knowledge of the GDPR, there was no systematic method to
develop shared understanding.
3) Inadequate Communication (15 of 41 tasks): Developers
told us that, due to the implicit and cross-cutting nature of
NFRs, they were not aware of the value of communicating
NFRs until it was too late, e.g. a manager at Alpha explained
“nobody explained to him what RELIABILITY was” and “then
somebody gave them a code review or whatever and said,
oh you should have done it this way.” Developers explicitly
reported communication problems. For example, developers
working on the same problem, almost simultaneously, in
isolation of each other but not communicating the right in-
formation, which created MAINTAINABILITY issues e.g. “two
people [developing] independently, they talk to each other
well, but you’re still going to approach problems differently
and hit different areas of the system and not know everything
that’s going on. So there was no notion of or expectation of
MAINTAINABILITY” (Manager at Beta).
Communication is the key to ensuring all developers have
a shared understanding of NFRs; however, communication is
often lacking, e.g. “it’s just a PERFORMANCE matter, but
yeah, just the people involved were unfamiliar with what
they’re using” (Developer at Beta). Communication is also
time sensitive, it might “take a little while before they sort
of enter the common knowledge of the company” (Developer
at Alpha) according to a developer at Alpha in reference to
EXTENSIBILITY and MAINTAINABILITY.
In other instances, a developer makes a false assumption
that everyone else has the same understanding of terminology,
knowledge, or perception of an NFR and the need to com-
municate the NFR is overlooked. For example, the definition
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Fig. 2. NFRs with ≥ 6 NFR-related tasks (RQ2)
of quality and releasable is different between two developers,
“it’s a lack of understanding of like what is quality software
and what does releasable mean?” (Manager at Gamma).
Communication break-downs can also lead to challenges
in disseminating information. For example, EXTENSIBILITY
and PERFORMANCE suffered at one organization due to “two
different developers building the front-end and the back-end
at different times. Only like a week or two apart, but they
weren’t communicating well enough to each other and it
wasn’t enough like top-down planning of that” (Manager at
Gamma). As a result, high priority rework occurred to rectify
the effects of the lack of shared understanding.
RQ2: Which NFRs are Most Associated with Lack of Shared
Understanding? We asked each organization what NFRs were
associated with each task (Q3). The results of NFRs with
at least six or more associated NFR-tasks are in Figure 2.
Each task could be associated with multiple NFRs. The
top NFRs: RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY,
USABILITY, and EXTENSIBILITY, respectively occurred in 17,
16, 15, and 14 tasks.
RQ3: What Amount of a Lack of Shared Understanding
is Accidental versus Essential? Recall we asked participants
whether the lack of shared understanding was avoidable (Q7).
We also asked participants how the lack of shared understand-
ing could be avoided (Q5) and why this action was not taken
(Q6).
Overall, the responses show 78% of the lack of shared
understanding of NFRs was considered accidental across our
organizations. The remaining 22% represents a essential lack
of shared understanding.
Practices to Avoid Lack of Shared Understanding In re-
sponse to Q5 and Q6, two primary practices emerged to avoid
a lack of shared understanding: standards, and communication
and documentation. However, in many cases the focus groups
with our research team was the first time the organization had
realized the true cost of lack of shared understanding.
a) Shared Development Standards (22 of 41 tasks):
Our organizations believed further adopting more development
standards could build shared understanding, particularly for
MAINTAINABILITY. This would prevent rework, e.g. “any time
you needed a place to put something we used to toss them on
that big stack of unorganized classes until it became a giant
object” (Developer at Beta) The lack of shared understanding
means the giant object must be refactored and manifested
MAINTAINABILITY issues ultimately created functional prob-
lems, as noted by a developer at Beta, “the rework on it was
not only to refactor it [...] but essentially to handle the type
of structure used and [redacted] caused problems throughout
the app.”
Standards can be applied to multiple facets of an orga-
nization, not limited to coding standards. Our organizations
are actively standardizing their development methodology.
Gamma mandates a developer must create a task to record
work exceeding one hour, to help foster a shared understand-
ing. This can help a new employee assigned to improve the
DEPLOYABILITY of the infrastructure, who may not have the
context of the original infrastructure. If the original devel-
oper is unavailable, the assigned employee has no shared
understanding (e.g. why was Jenkins modified?). Similarly,
a manager at Beta maintains that creating a standardized
development process can “create more shared understanding
in more advanced design up-front” to help avoid USABILITY
issues.
b) Adequate Communication and Documentation (19 of
41 tasks): Unsurprisingly, inadequate communication was one
of the main contributors to lack of shared understanding, an
obvious solution is to have an adequate amount of communica-
tion; however, more surprisingly is that this was not occurring
often enough. We observed communication issues between
developers and a) other developers, b) support analysts, c)
testers, d) product managers, and e) managers. For example,
Gamma experienced a situation where “[developer] was off on
his own and he wasn’t interacting with the development team
or the project management team [and was short-sighted]”,
causing major MAINTAINABILITY challenges. A manager at
Gamma said the MAINTAINABILITY issue could be resolved
by “better coordination and communication”, as the developer
was a contractor and isolated from the rest of the development
team and “there was no documentation about it.” Additional
documentation, code review, or walk-through was all that was
needed to avoid the lack of shared understanding.
Communication across organizational roles is essential to
reduce lack of shared understanding of NFRs. For example,
Alpha had a lack of shared understanding of DEPLOYABILITY
due to miscommunication between management and develop-
ers, “[we are] handing them off to a specific account manager
and teaching them how to work through the system.” Addi-
tionally, a manager at Gamma indicates “more collaboration
to begin with” may be necessary to alleviate issues associated
with MAINTAINABILITY, EXTENSIBILITY, and SCALABILITY.
In Gamma’s case, the issue arose because there was a lack
of communication between a developer working on a feature
and the rest of the development team. In consequence, the
developer was unaware of the expectations in conjunction with
rest of the software. This issue could be mitigated if more
6
upfront communication was established and the developer had
a shared understanding of the development team’s practices.
Documentation is communication that takes the form of ex-
plicit shared understanding. For example, a developer from
Alpha believes “documentation [is desired] because [it gives]
you understanding what’s going on during that time frame”.
Without documentation, tracking decisions and actions may
be difficult. Moreover, on-boarding and training is challenging
without documentation serving as a guide.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work we aimed to empirically investigate shared
understanding in RE. In particular, we studied the lack of
shared understanding of NFRs and its effects as traced in the
form of rework in software projects. Using mixed-methods, we
studied three small, agile organizations practicing CSE and
using cloud-based platforms. We found some NFRs (RQ2)
(RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, USABIL-
ITY, and EXTENSIBILITY) are more prone to lack of shared
understanding in these organizations, and the majority of this
lack of shared understanding (78%) was accidental, i.e. avoid-
able, whereas 22% represented essential, i.e. not avoidable,
lack of shared understanding (RQ3).
From our analysis three factors contributing to the lack of
shared understanding (RQ1) emerged: fast pace of change,
lack of domain knowledge, and inadequate communication.
We start our discussion of these findings in the context of
our organizations’ operating environment. In particular, these
were agile organizations practicing CSE, which we believe
may pose additional challenges to the treatment of NFRs. We
aim to shed some light on the complex relationship between
shared understanding, rework, and CSE.
We also identified two practices (RQ3) (shared development
standards and adequate communication and documentation)
whereby organizations may benefit in building a shared under-
standing and awareness of NFRs. However, organizations have
a fixed set of resources and thus need to strategically prioritize
when to build a shared understanding against developing new
features. Our next point in discussion will be on when and how
organizations could employ these strategies to build shared
understanding in the context of CSE.
We believe these findings have important research implica-
tions for the intersection of shared understanding of NFRs
and CSE. In addition, our final discussion point refers to
practical implications from our findings, including adaptations
we believe may enable a more proactive approach to avoid
rework due to an accidental lack of shared understanding.
A. Shared Understanding and CSE
At first sight, CSE advocates for ongoing customer feed-
back and rapid iteration cycles [38] that should result in a
heightened understanding of customer requirements. In our
deeper empirical investigation, our study reveals the potential
for a much more complex relationship between lack of shared
understanding (as materialized in rework) and practices of
CSE. Our findings suggest that CSE may hurt the shared
understanding of NFRs and lead to rework.
One expected benefit of CSE is an improved validation of
requirements, due to rapid customer feedback [57]. A quick
feedback loop is associated with lowering the impact of lack of
shared understanding [3]. However, as NFRs are cross cutting
and difficult to decompose into sub-components that can be
completed within a short iteration [28], an NFR may take days,
weeks, or even months to evaluate. For example, at Alpha there
was rework due to a lack of shared understanding of PRIVACY
that was untestable, “we never really know what we’re testing
because it requires a host of real users hitting it to get an
accurate picture of your hits over the last couple of weeks,
developers wonâA˘Z´t have weeks of data.” Beta had a similar
experience where “a new FR came in to integrate a third-
party service, which we dutifully did, but it cratered system
PERFORMANCE. Embarrassingly, there were so many other
changes going on at the same time (some our own and some
seasonal) that it took us a few weeks to discover and then track
down the problem.” For our organizations, we hypothesize that
CSE hurts the shared understanding of NFRs, much like how
agile RE practices increase the risk of overemphasis of FRs
[7]. A notable complication is CSE has a broader scope than
agile, as not only do you need to slice NFRs [58], but you need
to subsequently ship them in rapid, frequent deployments [59].
We found NFRs were de-prioritized in CSE, in part due to
the frequent release of FRs being a top priority and a lack
of shared understanding, around either domain or technical
knowledge. NFRs may not get prioritized until the right
(profitable) customer complains, e.g. “flagship user of this
product, deemed very important” (Manager at Beta). At our
organizations, product managers are often tasked with creating,
prioritizing, and validating tasks. Tasks were typically only
created for FRs, and the NFRs are usually implicit, and in
some cases as what Glinz and Fricker call ‘dark information’,
i.e., relevant but unnoticed knowledge [3].
Another claimed benefit of CSE is the removal of intra-
organizational barriers, such as between product managers,
DevOps, and developers [38]. These barriers are prohibitive to
both adequate communication and acquiring domain knowl-
edge. By tearing down these barriers, CSE should help al-
leviate the difficulty associated with cross-cutting NFRs that
require input from multiple individuals and roles across an
organization. However, we found that a lack of shared under-
standing existed across organizational departments and roles
and NFRs remain difficult for non-developers to grasp. Product
managers in particular ceded control of NFRs to developers,
relying on intuition to verify the NFR was achieved: “we’re
going to see this thing before it goes out the door and we’ll
know something feels wrong in terms of a NFR” (Manager at
Beta). In particular, PERFORMANCE and SCALABILITY cannot
be validated by a single product manager “knowing when
something feels wrong,” when they actually require thousands
of customers to verify.
Our findings also suggest a disconnect between development
and product management at these organizations practicing
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CSE, where a product owner would typically bridge the knowl-
edge gap. Unlike agile development, CSE does not define
a product owner role, who would have substantial technical
and customer domain knowledge. At our organizations the
product manager role was responsible for writing the tasks and
deciding each task’s priority. However, due to this disconnect
NFRs requiring substantial technical and customer domain
knowledge, such as SECURITY and PRIVACY [60], were often
neglected or underspecified [61] leading to a lack of shared
understanding. We found the primary difference between an
agile product owner and our organization’s product managers
is the insufficient level of technical knowledge; therefore, CSE
may be left without the benefit of a true product owner.
On the positive side, CSE relies heavily on writing and
maintaining numerous test cases (a form of shared understand-
ing) that are part of the automated CSE build [3]. However,
we found that our organizations did not heavily invest in sub-
stantial testing efforts, even for FRs. Furthermore, NFRs are
difficult to test [26], [27] and may require specific architectural
considerations to be automatically tested [62], therefore NFRs
are largely left as a manual task in CSE [63]. The lack of
NFR tests could be due to a lack of shared understanding (i.e.
they don’t know which ones to test); alternatively, it could
contribute to lack of shared understanding of NFRs, (i.e. tests
themselves represent shared understanding anyone can read,
modify, or execute). For example, INTEROPERABILITY may
be degraded due to inadequate tests “the root of it is we built
one half (front-end) without building the other (back-end)”
(Developer at Beta). Even if an NFR is not fully tested as
part of the CSE pipeline, the organizations are not realizing
the full benefits of the CSE pipeline due to a lack of tests.
One key to building a shared understanding of NFRs through
tests in CSE is to, at the very least, have imperfect tests [64];
these imperfect tests are the first step in acknowledging and
bringing awareness to the value of the NFR and start fostering
a shared understanding.
Research Implication 1
Our evidence suggests that one possible side-effect of
CSE is a decrease in the shared of understanding of
NFRs that leads to rework. There is a need for further
exploratory studies to confirm this, as well as defining
roles, methods, and tools to identify and mitigate the
potential lack of shared understanding in CSE. How
could revised methodologies leverage a partnership
and mutual respect between product managers and
developers to ensure adequate dissemination of NFR
and domain knowledge in CSE organizations?
B. What Triggered Our Organizations to Build a Shared
Understanding?
Our organizations were not actively trying to build a shared
understanding. In the CSE approach, they try something and
assess the viability once it is deployed in the CSE pipeline.
If it was not viable (e.g., did not increase revenue) they
simply pivot to other features and tasks. As we discussed
in the preceding section, our organizations acknowledge that
rework due to an accidental lack of shared understanding
of NFRs is a problem. However, the question of when to
build a shared understanding of NFRs is tricky. Rather than
proactively doing this, our organizations relied on reactive
stimuli. They used different triggers to identify the need for
building shared understanding of NFRs. These triggers were
regulatory requirements, accumulating technical debt, needs of
important customers, and disruption of service.
1) Regulatory Requirements: A core part of each organi-
zation’s business was to collect and use customer data. The
incentive for building a shared understanding of regulatory
NFRs, such as PRIVACY and SECURITY, is to reduce the poten-
tial liability. These laws or regulations, such as the GDPR, are
important and comprehensive, as non-compliance could result
in crippling financial or legal penalties [56]. Explicit regulatory
policies, such as PRIVACY, can be extracted, visualized, and
re-published to ensure a higher quality of shared understanding
between various stakeholders [65].
For Gamma, the GDPR represented making substantial
adjustments not only to the organization’s business, but also
raising the level of shared understanding of PRIVACY. Instead
of PRIVACY being an important, but possibly unconsidered
quality when faced with time constraints, Gamma needs to
ensure that everyone (i.e. not only developers) in the organi-
zation has a shared understanding of the GDPR. For instance,
third-party services and libraries must be verified for GDPR
compliance [56]. Employees need to understand the risk of
finding and using an external library without first vetting the
library for PRIVACY considerations.
2) Accumulating Technical Debt: At our organizations,
another trigger was to build a shared understanding of NFRs
when the organization had incurred significant technical debt
as a result of accidental lack of shared understanding. This
often occurs when technical debt is ignored, potentially exac-
erbated by the fast pace of CSE, and the belated response
by technical staff to recognize the need to change [66].
Refactoring software has many benefits, in particular for
NFRs, such as increased RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY,
and REUSABILITY [67], [68]. However, we believe the ben-
efit is usually technical in nature (e.g. the system becomes
more RELIABLE) and the impact of refactoring on shared
understanding is yet unknown. Due to the amount and con-
straints of technical debt, two organizations (Alpha and Beta)
rearchitected their entire systems from scratch. The effect of
this rearchitecture was two-pronged. First, each organization
had the opportunity to build an entirely new architecture.
The new architecture encouraged developers to openly discuss
and evaluate NFRs, such as AVAILABILITY, SCALABILITY,
DEPLOYABILITY, SCALABILITY, and MAINTAINABILITY, and
developed a well-understood, shared understanding of these
NFRs. Second, each organization was able to build a shared
understanding of not-well-understood, legacy NFRs from the
previous system in achieving feature parity between the two.
Thus, we found that refactoring can potentially increase the
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shared understanding of NFRs.
3) Needs of Important Customer: As our organizations
have a broad set of customers, each of which must be satisfied,
it is vitally important to identify and prioritize perspective
customers [69]; however, often the focus is on FRs. At two
of our organizations (Alpha and Gamma) we found that a
shared understanding was triggered as a result of some input
from an important customer or client, usually in the form of
a complaint. At Alpha an important customer was using a
very large dataset, which Alpha had not considered or tested.
This large dataset caused PERFORMANCE issues due to a
lack of SCALABILITY in the architecture and resulted in a
high priority rework task. As a result of the high priority, a
shared understanding was developed for both PERFORMANCE
and SCALABILITY across a large number of developers. The
shared understanding made developers aware that the original
implementation lacked PERFORMANCE measures (and how to
fix them) and brought attention to the various scales with
which customers were using their system. Had this customer
not been as important Alpha may not have focused the
necessary resources to build this shared understanding.
4) Disruption of Service: Disruptions of service are never
a desired trait, as a recent disruption at Amazon was estimated
to cost $66,240 per minute of downtime [70]. Disruption of
service usually involves a loss of functionality, and subsequent
rework to patch the problem. The silver lining in a disruption is
that we found our organizations focused on the lack of shared
understanding of NFRs when a disruption of their service
occurred. Service disruptions are usually tightly related to an
NFR, AVAILABILITY or SCALABILITY issues. If the effect
of the disruption was small (i.e. one small customer or one
small rarely used component) then the shared understanding
was not widespread. Participants in our study claimed that
incident post-mortems as an excellent example of how service
outages can (somewhat painfully) force organizations to con-
front gaps in shared understanding. For example, Alpha uses
post-mortems to increase understanding to focus on the most
important aspects of the service.
Research Implication 2
The fast paced CSE environment is one possible
explanation why an organization would be more re-
active to triggers, such as technical debt, as opposed
to proactive in building a shared understanding of
NFRs. We believe there is a need for further empirical
evidence and examples of triggers, both reactive and
proactive, and methods and tools to help identify
triggers as opportunities to build shared understand-
ing. How effective are triggers in building shared
understanding? How can we identify reactive triggers
before rework occurs and use them as proactive trig-
gers? Is there a difference in the level of shared un-
derstanding between a reactive and proactive trigger?
C. Implications to Practice: How Could Organizations Build
a Shared Understanding in CSE?
Upon encountering a trigger (i.e. regulatory requirements,
rectifying technical debt, important customer complaints, and
disruptions of service) for building a shared understanding,
the next step is actually initializing a response. However, our
organizations are largely reactive to rework due to accidental
lack of shared understanding (e.g., responding to a disruption
or customer complaint), as opposed to being proactive in
building a shared understanding. RE research has shown that a
certain amount of proactive RE is valuable [19]. Furthermore,
the participants in our study suggested two practices that could
help them build a shared understanding: shared development
standards and documentation and communication. We discuss
practical implications as suggested by our empirical findings
and which we believe would enable an organization to achieve
a more proactive RE approach to their software projects.
While shared standards for documenting NFRs across an or-
ganization are necessary to build a shared understanding [71],
we do not believe the documentation needs to be exhaustive or
complete. Much like agile encourages “working software over
comprehensive documentation”, there is a minimum level of
NFR documentation required to achieve a shared understand-
ing in CSE. An organization must strike a balance to meet
this minimum, and sufficient, level of NFR documentation
[72]. While determining what is considered a sufficient level
of documentation might be different at each organization [73],
a minimum level could be as simple as writing the NFR as
part of the acceptance criteria in a task to a more involved
characterization [74].
An organization should first select a single, vitally important
NFR, such as PERFORMANCE or RELIABILITY based on their
own context. In the most simplistic manner possible, the NFR
must be documented to ensure cross-functional visibility. All
of our organizations maintain some form of dashboard that
helps increase cross-functional visibility, thus we believe these
dashboards are able to act as a form of documentation and be
beneficial in increasing the cross-functional visibility of the
NFR. However, documentation on its own is not sufficient for
building a shared understanding.
Communication is a well known and studied knowledge
management practice [75], [76], thus the next logical step is
to share this minimal NFR documentation across roles and
departments in a CSE practising organization, which may
require cognitive understanding [77]. Establishing a cognitive
shared understanding involves identifying insufficiency in an
organization’s understanding and rectifying misunderstandings
[77]. The method of communication to establish this cognitive
understanding could materialize in a variety of forms, includ-
ing face-to-face conversations, emails, or corporate branding.
Once a standard level of NFR documentation has been
developed and disseminated across all roles and organizational
departments, then the value and awareness of the NFR must be
incentivized to achieve buy-in from all roles and organizational
departments. This may be achieved through executive sponsor-
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ship through a top-down approach. In contrast, documentation
can also be achieved from the grassroots level, where devel-
opers initialize and progress towards disseminating knowledge
between roles in the interest of self-help.
Finally, the NFR itself should be verified as part of the
CSE pipeline. A well-known solution [28], [78] is to ensure
NFRs can be quantified, for example as response measures or
acceptance criteria. As part of their efforts for AUDITABILITY,
our collaborating organizations actively add metrics to catch
errors and increase insight on their system. We recognize that
some NFRs are more difficult to verify than others; although
even PRIVACY has been managed through custom tools that
automatically tests for software deficiencies [56]. Once an
NFR can be verified, the results should be publicly displayed
throughout the organization, to continue and maintain a high
level of awareness. Furthermore, if a particular NFR is not
satisfied an organization can adopt a similar practice from
lean software development whereby all employees must halt
production to fix an issue [79], which will help excite shared
understanding across roles and departments. This ensures
that shared understanding is consistent and maintained across
the organization, including new employees. Ultimately, we
believe that building awareness and educating the organization
regarding the value behind building a shared understanding of
NFRs, including priority, is paramount to software success.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
To ensure validity of our qualitative research, we provide a
replication package (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3671463),
including statistics of the analyzed tasks, codebook, and inter-
rater agreement sessions. Unfortunately, due to non-disclosure
and ethics agreements we are unable to reveal full transcripts.
We discuss threats present in data gathering, data analysis,
and the results. When gathering data, we mitigated the effects
of respondent bias (the observer effect) through two steps.
First, we assured the participants that our presence was not to
critique them, but rather to acquire insight about lack of shared
understanding of NFRs in their respective organizations. Sec-
ond, we discussed with two participants simultaneously for
each focus group and encouraged the participants to not only
talk to us, but also to each other. To ensure the participants had
a shared understanding of particular terms (e.g. NFR, shared
understanding, avoidable) we discussed the definitions prior to
our questions. For construct validity, while interviewing partic-
ipants we defined and used the term avoidable lack of shared
understanding; however, in our theoretical conceptualization
we use the creative analogy of accidental or essential. We
also used transcription tools to help transcribe the audio of
the discussion. To ensure that the transcription was accurate,
a human listened and verified each audio file. One limitation
may be our task sampling, as we did not analyze every task.
This was due to the limited time we had with each organization
and restricted access to the data. However, the organization
participants felt our selected tasks were representative of tasks
in their context.
With respect to credibility in data analysis, we conducted
pair coding until we reached a point where we consistently
achieved a moderate to substantial level of inter-rater agree-
ment. Second, we conducted two rounds of member checking
with our organizations and participants. The first round of
member checking involved the organizations confirming the 41
tasks were rework as a result of lack of shared understanding
of an NFR. The second round of member checking verified
our findings and themes, including factors contributing to and
practices to avoid lack of shared understanding of an NFR. We
elicited ordinal feedback (Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
on each of our themes and practices. For all three themes
and three practices, the respondents had a median score of
“Agree”. Another threat is the relatively small sample size (41
tasks), partly due to the considerable amount of work required
for each task, and the limited time with our organizations.
Finally, for conclusion validity we recognize that our research
implications are phrased as hypotheses, not factual conclu-
sions, requiring further research investigations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Effectively building and managing a shared understanding
of requirements is key to successful software projects. NFRs
pose additional challenges given their cross-cutting nature that
makes them more difficult to handle, particularly in CSE
deployments.
Evidence from our study suggests that CSE negatively
affects the shared understanding of NFRs, resulting in im-
portant implications to research that should reconsider RE in
the context of CSE. Our research renews and refocuses our
awareness on the complex relationship between rework and
shared understanding in CSE.
With respect to practical implications of our study, CSE
does not absolve an organization’s responsibility to maintain
a shared understanding of NFRs, including tracking and eval-
uating how much rework occurs due to an accidental lack of
shared understanding. An organization may also proactively
engage employees in building a shared understanding of NFRs.
To a large extent, the effort that organizations expend on
building shared understanding or mitigating the effects of a
lack of it will depend on an organization’s ability to weigh the
cost of the accidental lack of shared understanding of NFRs
relative to its need for functional delivery. Development of
methods for such assessment, and to address the other research
implications mentioned above are worthy of future work.
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